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Abstract 
 
The most recently challenges in Public Management are felt in several countries, which 
lead to the appearance of a set of innovative initiatives in the field of the Public 
Administration. This concept, more or less global (kellt, 2001), of administrative reform 
is known as the New Public Management and appears with the goal to improve the 
efficiency, the effectiveness and citizen satisfaction in public services. Is mainly based 
in the introduction of market type mechanism and the adoption of private management 
tools. It promotes the competition between public and private agents in order to succeed 
an improvement in service quality, at the same time that it reduces production costs 
(Hartley, Butler e Benington, 2002, p. 388). 
 
 
According to NPM models presented by Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald e Pettigrew 
(1996) that takes into account that there isn’t a clear definition of what it’s the NPN, the 
agenda of administrative reform in Portugal, is base on the two first’s models. It’s 
settled in politic of budgetary restriction, decentralization and atomization of Public 
Administration. Although it’s autonomy, the local governance also is affected by theses 
options of Central Administration.     
 
 
If in the countries of Anglo-Saxon origin, the model of reform of local power, it’s based 
in the adoptions of specific programs of management as the Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering, o Best Value, in Portugal the reality is different. The administrative 
modernization was made mainly by changes in the administrative organization and in 
the transfer of power between the different levels of Portuguese Public Administration, 
rather than by the implementation of specific management programs of modernization. 
This is due to the classic/continental administrative model which still is the Portuguese 
administrative mainframe. Reforms nowadays are still being implemented through 
financial legislation as a way of Central Administration spread reforms ideology to 
Local Governments. 
 
 
The local administration stars to win relative importance after 24 of April of 1974. This 
level of administration is characterized by autonomy and decentralization principles. 
Actually, this local power is guide by a new law of local financial. It’s relevant to 
analyse and debate the consequence of this new law and understand it’s proposed in a 
NPM reform context. This paper is based on a Master project and it seeks this 
objectives. This constitutes a challenge to analyse in comparison with the others the 
degree of bigger centrality and/or autonomy that the same ones reflected.   
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Perspective of Change in Public Administration 
 
The last decades of twentieth century, represented an enormous challenge to the public 
sector management in the most developed countries. The administrative changes 
appeared in different contexts to solve similar problems, with complementary strategies.      
 
 
From all these changes the concept of New Public Management arises, identifying an 
emergent paradigm in Public Administration. The New Public Management (NPM) as a 
management model is difficult to be correctly defined. Even the academic community is 
divided when considering or not the NPM as a true management theory of Public 
Administration (McLaughlin, 2002) denomination, although, allow us to identify all 
efforts made over the last few decades of twentieth century to modernize and to reform 
Public Management Model. To Hood (1991, p. 4) and Lane (2000), it’s an international 
movement based on the reaction to the dissatisfaction adopted by the management 
model of Welfare State and in the increasing tax burdens over the citizens. The 
objective is to improve efficiency in Public Administration and to adjust it’s reality to 
the information era, in other words, to move on the bureaucratic paradigm (Gray & 
Jenkins, 1995, p. 76). NPM is based on the introduction of market type mechanisms and 
the adoption of private management tools to solve the problems of Public 
Administration. It promotes the competition between suppliers of public goods and 
services in the expectation of an improvement of the service delivery for the citizen (at 
quality level) and, at the same time, a reduction of production costs (Hartley, Butler, & 
Benington, 2002, p. 388).  
 
Hood (1991) presents us the different dimensions of analysis and changes that 
characterize the NPM and the paradigmatic change in Public Administration. A concern 
for the financial control is denoted through the reduction of the expenditures, the 
professionalization and decentralization of the Public Administration. Moreover, it also 
seeks the use of new management tools (to rethink and to improve flexibility in 
contracting staff and the budgetary system) and to control and evaluate the management 
by the results and not only for the processes. 
 
The introduction of the NPM carries out the decentralization of public units, the 
reorganization of management processes, the redefinition of organizational objectives 
and a higher concentration on customer satisfaction (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000, p. 
550). NPM intends to transfer the power to the managers of each administrative agency 
and to cease the hierarchic dependence relations within other levels of Public 
Administration. The bureaucratical control was substituted by a new system of 
auditorships. The creation of new independent regulating organisms for each one of the 
liberalized markets is needed (Hood, James, Jones, Scott, & Travers, 1998).  
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Figure 1 - The New Public Management 
 
Doctrine Meaning Justification 
1.Profissional 
Management 
Public Manager with freedom to 
act  
The Responsibility needs 
managers perfectly identified  
2. Performance Measures  Definition of performance Indicators  Responsibility and efficiency  
3. Output Control  expenditures and rewards linked to performance  
Focus on achievements not in 
process  
4. Fragmentation of 
Public Units  
Creation of more flexible and 
decentralized units  
Use of contracts between public 
units and private ones  
5. Competition in Public 
Sector  
Liberalization of the use of 
contract mechanism  Rivality  make lower cost  
6. Use of Private 
Management Tools   
Freedom to punish inefficiency 
and reward effectiveness  
Better Management seizing  
market opportunities  
7. Discipline in 
Management  
Cut back in cost and raise of 
productivity  Need to do more with less 
 
Source: Adapted from Hood 1991 
 
This theory of public management reform challenges some organizational purposes, 
used in Public Administration. Although, having a  high level of stability and there for 
hardly substituted for others, the principles of the self-sufficiency, direct control, 
political accountability and the coordination by processes standardization are affected 
and suffer mutations that transform the face of Public Administration (Stewart & Wlash, 
1992). 
 
First, the self-sufficiency estimates that the Public Administration while one solid 
organization, can give efficient answers to all citizen’s requests. So, administrative 
structures had been created, in the direct dependence of politician power, with the 
mission to satisfy the collective necessities. Thus, these organizations spread beyond the 
central services offices, also having local executive services as a way to cover all 
territory needs. Although this apparent multiplicity of agents with responsibilities in 
public services, the fact is that in all the cases we’re dealing with Central 
Administration integrated in the different ministries. As a consequence, Public 
Administration is as a heavy structure of formal communication, where orders normally 
flow from top to bottom. The NPM purpose a course of action based on the creation of 
agencies and the fragmentation of public units1. This can be done in two dimensions. 
One through the decentralization, higher autonomy and specialization of public 
organizations, another, through the act of contracting out as a market agent capable to 
produce efficiency and improvement of service.  
 
Second, direct control implies a relation of hierarchy and/or political dependency 
between the promoter and the producer of goods and services. Acting as an all unit, 
politicians use legitimately their hierarchic powers to emit orders, to revoke decisions 
and to sanction public servants. In many cases the standardization by processes and by 
                                                
1 Mostly based on the assumption that that’s a good solution to the efforts of better efficiency 
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qualifications is the method more suitable to co-ordinate and to control the activities 
developed in organizations with the dimension and stability of the Public 
Administration (Mintzberg, 2004). With the introduction of new actors (private and the 
third sector) as well as with the atomization of the public units, hierarchic power is 
substituted by contracts regulations. Thus, the power of the politicians is created by the 
celebration of the contract and is limited to the terms in it was written.  
 
Third, the political accountability is based on the fact that acting under the same 
organization, the responsibility over the action of the Public Administration falls on the 
politician’s sphere. The proliferation of contracts allows a change in the traditional 
accountability. Nowadays it’s made by multiplied actors in different terms. Politicians 
continue to have a responsibility to evaluate the performance of the contracted agent, 
however they do it on behave of the contract terms. This responsibility, to control the 
contracted agent, is now also shared with the citizens who are invited to have an active 
paper in the evaluation of the performance of the consumed public service.  
 
Fourth, the formal coordination through a hierarchic mechanism of government implies 
a high level of formalization. It is associated with authority and domination from the top 
management to the remaining elements of the organization. It seats on the distribution 
of responsibilities and the establishment of direct lines of control. Top-down formal 
structure of communication is created to allow each element to know what it expects of 
him, at what time in what way. NPM implies others mechanisms of governance. One 
made through market mechanism where the coordination is based on the natural 
competition between the agents. The self interest leads to the coordination of efforts 
(Bradach & Eccles, 1991). And another through networks with the creation of 
partnerships between actors in order to create permanent interaction between agents. 
This will promote an integrated mechanism of decision making, combining 
complementary competences.  
 
 
MODELS OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
 
As we said before, NPM produces different impacts in several dimensions of traditional 
management. As an aggregation of experiences of administrative reform it’s natural that 
the NPM has different consequences or impacts in each country, mostly in spite of each 
socioeconomic reality, and each administrative and cultural system used. Ferie, 
Ashburner, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew (1996, p. 10) suggest us four different models of 
NPM (or if we want four moments of evolution). 
 
 
MODEL 1 –STRESS ON EFFICIENCY  
 
This model assumes a negative vision on the previous model of Public Administration 
(bureaucratic model of the constructed Professional Administration during the Welfare 
State), considering it as a model without alternatives to motivate the workers, too much 
expensive and with an exaggerated level of bureaucratic procedures. The main objective 
is an economic and financial equilibrium of Public Administration, obtained through the 
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introduction of private management initiatives is a way that the public sector will be 
more similar to the private. 
 
In this perspective, the administrative reform has as objectives, to guarantee an effective 
costs saving through the control and financial situation. So, it’s necessary to use a 
portfolio of management mechanisms. The bureaucratic mechanisms of control are 
replaced by external auditorships procedures with the purpose to evaluate the efficiency 
of public money use; Definition control and monitorization of organizational objectives 
centralized in top management; the flexibility of legal labor relationships;  
 
This phase of NPM sometimes revels itself, a too economist view, proceeding to blind 
cut backs, stopping investment expenditures that could help economic growth and 
development. However, it has the virtue to control public expenditures. Nevertheless, 
Public Administration still was too big and too slow when answering to external 
challenge. 
 
 
MODEL 2 – DOCUS ON DECENTRALIZATION  
 
There is an attempt to invert the logic followed until the decade of 70 in constructing 
organizations that promoted vertical integration. NPM suggests a transformation within 
Public Administration towards the construction of more flexible and orientated to 
specific missions units. The burocratic organizations give place to new agencies with 
the capacity to adapt and to identify itself to different and more challenging 
environments, respecting the interests of the users whom they intend to serve.     
 
Therefore, this model provides the appearance of organizations with lower dimension 
favors the specialization in production, frees the government from the responsibility to 
produce public services. The fragmentation of public sector and the liberalization of its 
market has allowed the competitivity of new agents, with the objective of increasing 
efficiency to citizens. It allowed, with the use of contracts, a greater and better control 
over agencies. However it was necessary, after the financial equilibrium and the use of 
market type mechanism under a organizational revolution, to give the next step towards 
quality in public management.  
 
MODEL 3 – DN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE    
 
While the previous models of reform had focus on internal aspect of the Public 
Administration organization, next will focus on the citizens satisfaction and his part on 
public management. To promote this kind of change we must understand the need to 
modify management process as well as ethical values and believes of public servants. 
Which is the same as to promote the organizational development.  
 
The administrative modernization is seen as processes that cannot be performed top-
bottom, but it need to be a desired process by all the elements of the organization. The 
changes have to be presented and accepted by all employees in order for them to 
understand its need and importance. The organizational culture is considered to be 
stronger than any hierarchic control. 
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It is in this process of change that NPM proposes the Total Quality Management and the 
search of Excellence as a management philosophy. The Total Quality Management 
intends to be a global philosophy that all the elements of the organization do in an effort 
for the satisfaction of the customer. The age of mass production was already exceeded, 
we are in the age of “post-fordism” as a mechanism of capital accumulation. The 
consumer preferences change every day and that leads to market segmentation. The 
efficiency of the organizations is obtained whenever the organization achieved 
integration in each branch of market that it intends to reach.  
 
As a consequence of the previous models it’s a priority that public agencies, with bigger 
autonomy and acting within market pressures, assume product differentiation and 
quality as a main target. We also seek a better identification with citizens’ needs and 
better customer services. (Berzelay, 2001; Gains, 1999). 
 
MODEL 4 – DOWARD A BETTER CITIZENSHIP 
 
This model, accepts the necessity to readapt the very notion of Public Service. In order 
to do so, the introduction of market mechanisms and tools of private management can 
be absorbed with a lot of advantages without however, destroying the concept of Public 
Service. It’s necessary to understand that Public Administration is not a company, 
although it can be managed similarly (Ferlie, Pettigrew, Ashburner, & Fitzgerald, 1996, 
p. 57; Van Gramberg & Teicher, 2000, p. 488). That is, it’s understandable all the 
efforts to be efficient, to decentralize organizational responsibilities. Financial concerns 
are also acceptable, but Public Administration can’t be mistaken about its main 
objective, to serve the citizen. In this perspective citizens are seen and considered in two 
levels, one as consumers and another one as an active element of the Public 
Administration management. Assuming the notion of citizens as customer they can 
foment the quality of the services, and at the same time, valorizing their citizenship, 
acting as a control and evaluator on the contracted agent. 
  
These models can be understood as an evolution process. The starting point is a 
producer State with the responsibility to deliver public services. Feeling the necessity to 
control the increase of its expenses, the State appeals to cut backs and to the 
introduction of internal control systems. Wanting to improve the management capacity 
and the levels of efficiency, NPM introduced public-private partnerships. Bit by bit the 
big State has been transformed into a regulator one. The question of the quality is 
assumed as a necessary issue to control its lost. Finally, the citizen ends to play a central 
role in public management, acts as a judge towards public agencies 
Changes in Local Governments 
 
The conception of a State and a Public Administration, highly centralized, legalist and 
bureaucratic has, nowadays, few defenders. Is more common the existence of different 
levels of government (“multi-level governance” according to Hooghe and Marks 2003), 
that is, a system where power is dispersed for several levels of authority - supranational, 
national, regional and local.  
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The dispersion in the decision process imply some decentralization, in other words, the 
transference of attributions and competencies of the Central Administration for the sub-
national levels; for what it’s necessary to establish rules that regulate the existence of 
these different levels of government and its inter-relations. The Local Governments 
have direct democratic legitimacy, considering that the representatives of these 
governments are elected democratically for the citizens. In other words, they have 
political decentralization (Pollitt, 2003). They, also, have financial decentralization. It 
refers to the way how the functions and the public resources are distributed by the 
several levels of government, including the expenditures decentralization (distribution 
of the competences) and the revenue decentralization (distribution of the financial 
resources).  
 
According to John (2001), and comparing some countries of the Western Europe, it’s 
possible to distinguish two systems of Local Governments: the South and the North. 
Local Governments have a great autonomy and are responsible for a vast set of 
functions, in the South (in which are includes Portugal), although have political 
importance, Local Government have less responsibilities, indicating a more centralized 
system.  
 
In terms of “multi-level governance”, Portugal doesn’t represent an exception, being 
possible to identify at least two levels of government composed by the Central 
Government and for several Local Governments. The Portuguese Local Governments 
began to gain relative importance from April of 1974. Up to this date, and in the 
“Estado Novo”2 (New State) period, the local power was still, in terms of administrative 
activity, strongly centralized and didn’t have financial autonomy. With the Democratic 
Revolution of 1974, the representatives of the local power began to be elected by 
citizens (political decentralization). Add to this, the financial autonomy passed to be a 
reality in the Law of Local Finances and increased the attributions and competences of 
the Local Governments. Now, and in spite of some limitations, the Local Governments 
fulfill a primordial role in the provision of goods and public service at local level. In a 
short evolutive synthesis, the relation between the Central Administration and the Local 
Administration has been ruled for several Local Finances Laws that were approved 
along the years (from 1974 even to the present). These diplomas define the rules of 
existence of these two levels of government, indicating between other aspects, the 
underlying beginnings to the Local Governments, when are standing out the beginnings 
of the financial autonomy and the decentralization and the specific rules that regulate 
the transfers of the Central Government for the Local Governments. Relatively to this 
question, in our opinion, it’s a good indicator of financial dependence of the 
municipalities and they appoint one of the instruments of control used by the central 
power on the local power, indicating, in this way, a system more centralized (figure 2). 
 
                                                
2 Designation of Portuguese State and Legal Constitution since 1933 until 1974, during the dictatorial 
period 
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Figure 2 – Financial Dependence of Local Authorities3 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from General Directorate of the Local Government 2006 
  
 
Thus, this paper seeks to analyze two initiatives of reform that in our opinion, have 
substantially impact in Local Government organization and management reform. First, 
we analyze the mechanisms of creation of Municipal Enterprises as an entity that makes 
possible the ideas of organizational decentralization and flexible management. 
Secondly, we will proceed our analysis of the new Local Finances Law, trying to 
understand its tendency to be more or less centralized. 
 
MUNICIPAL ENTERPRISES 
 
While in Anglo-Saxon countries, the local power reform’s model passed for the 
adoption of specific programs of management as the Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering, the Best Value. Changes in Portuguese Local Government followed the 
Continental European model of Public Administration which emphasized the legal 
influence through the publication of legislation. Over the years several Laws and 
Decree-Laws transferred competencies from central government to local government to 
strengthen the powers and competencies of Local Government. Preceding this initiative 
was always a new law to reform local finances. 
 
Traditionally, Local Government were organized and structured in municipal services, 
administrative units which report directly to the Mayor under a strong hierarchic chain 
of command. Municipal services, together with departments and division, are part of the 
municipal structure responsible to implement the City Council’s decisions (Oliveira, 
2001, p. 128). In order to deal with the requirements of local public services like water 
supply, garbage collection, sewage, and street cleaning, which required a more flexible, 
autonomous and entrepreneur approach to service production and delivery, 
municipalities created municipalized services (Pereira and Almeida, 1985:214). 
                                                
3 Considering only the transfers of the Central Administration in way of municipal funds, given that the 
local authorities receive other types of transfers, it is possible to conclude that these have a significant 
weight in the revenues of the Local authorities. 
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Municipalized services, despite being under the direct control of the City Council, have 
a special statute which exempts them from some regulation of the municipal services. 
 
Municipalized services are an evolution of municipal services to deal with the specific 
issues raised by the industrial nature of the services mentioned above. They do not have 
juridical personality, but they have administrative and financial autonomy. That is, their 
decisions do not constitute definite administrative acts, but they have autonomy to 
elaborate their plan of activities, the budget and to manage personnel. They also have 
the power to charge tariffs for the public service.  
 
The strength of local government and the transference of competencies from central 
government to municipalities pressured the need to increase efficiency and the need to 
look for more flexible and modern model of organizations to deliver local public 
services. Thus, in 1998 the Law 59/98 allowed the creation of Municipal Enterprises, 
responsible for the delivering of local services. Municipal Enterprises are agencies with 
juridical personality and administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy. They are 
regulated by the law of public Enterprises and by the commercial society’s code. 
Municipal Enterprises were created with a similar approach to those of the private 
sector, but with the mission of developing activities under the monitoring of the Local 
Government. This process transfers the responsibility to produce and deliver local 
public services from the municipalities to such Enterprises in order to improve 
efficiency and quality. 
 
So, we can affirm that Municipal Enterprises solution is an alternative to promote the 
decentralization and specialization of public units. The fact is that Local Governments 
are heavy bureaucratic organizations, managed with a formal and mechanist systems, 
having difficulties to adapt itself to unstable environments and to redefine its strategy 
and management process (Bilhim, 2000). They had been structured with physic and 
human resources in order to accomplish a certain objective. The problem is when it’s 
necessary to modify his objective or when alterations in external environment occur. 
The introduction of new technologies, or the sprouting of new segments of market, can 
induce a necessity of strategical change and actualization. However this update cannot 
be an isolated act. The lack of adjustments of the other organizational elements, such as 
the process and structures is a dangerous drawback (Miles and Snow, 1984). The 
intention is that with the Municipal Enterprises provide the organizations with more 
agility, flexibility and greater capacity of integration with its environment. In short that 
they become more efficient.  
 
These Municipal Enterprises cease to be multi-objectives organizations, with a vast 
field of action to be an agency with a perfectly identified core business. Nowadays there 
isn’t much place for organizations with a medium level of citizen’s satisfaction. It’s 
necessary to create the excellency in organizations. It’s necessary to stress attention on 
customer and to be specialize in the satisfaction of their necessities. The idea is to adjust 
the structure of the Local Governments to current conjectures and challenges. It’s also 
through this gradual autonomy that Municipal Enterprises managers obtain greater 
control capacity over their performance. When concentrating in nuclear activities and 
defining performance indicators, objectives accomplishment will become easier to 
control (Pollitt, 1990; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Thus, the organizational 
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configurations of the Local Government are modified. The traditional structures give to 
place the structures with a different logic of share (figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 - New Public Management agencies and traditional structures 
 
 
Traditional Structures Municipal Enterprises  
Focus on the fulfillment of the rules Focus on Efficiency 
Monopoly Environment Market 
Hierarchy Structures Organic System 
Focus on stability Focus on innovation and adaptability 
Few Competition Great Competition 
Focus on Politics Focus on the productions of public services 
 Source: Adapted from Rehfuss 1991 
 
Thus, the creation of Municipal Enterprises fit in NPM model described previously as 
the one concerned to the organizational decentralization and responsibility distribution. 
With the use of this mechanism we verify changes in the way that organization were 
structured, especially in what concerned public unit fragmentation and mechanism of 
governance through market mechanisms. Actually Municipal Enterprises act in quasi-
markets and use private management tools. They plan and define objectives. They 
possess greater management freedom and flexibility dealing with partnerships and labor 
management. Partnerships are created and the Local Government acts as a broker 
combining specialized competences of different agents. However, the acceptance of 
NPM ideas is limited in some aspects and dimensions. Although the bureaucratic 
mechanisms of control had been replaced by the external systems of auditorships and 
fiscalization, an organizational relation between the Local Government and Municipal 
Enterprises still is very strong. Thus, we verified that Local Government influences 
Municipal Enterprises management through political appointments to the 
Administrative Councils and, in some cases, those management positions are occupied 
by elected politicians in a clear function accumulation. This fact injure the management 
autonomy and the need to separate administrative business and political fields argued by 
different authors (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Wilson, 1887). It’s also limiting the use of 
accountability to evaluate the performance of public managers. The use of contracts, as 
element of the administrative reform, is substancially diminished. 
 
The so called specialization of public units is, in some cases, far from the truth. Many 
Municipal Enterprises are constituted theoretically with a well defined and clear nuclear 
objective, however there are cases where the define objectives is so wide that it almost 
empty the Local Government responsibilities. In what concerns the use of market 
mechanisms, we notice that this solution is a bit different of contracting-out private 
agents. Thus, when the Local Government decides contract out to a private agent, the 
expectation is that the market competition produce a profitable solution. Opting for 
Municipal Enterprises we verify that this competition doesn’t exist, at least in a direct 
way, because they are created by Local Government without any type of procedure that 
implies competition with another agent (Rodrigues, 2005).  
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So, the solution of the Municipal Enterprises isn’t the total expression of NPM. It’s a 
more flexible and innovative form of delivering public services. However, from it’s 
application we verify that it exists 203 Municipal Enterprises (in a total of 308 Local 
Governments) that, in its majority (about 50%), they are used to manage public 
equipment (theaters, swimming pools, among others) and the treatment of water and 
wastes. Many of them have an unbalanced financial situation with harmful impacts to 
Local Government. Thus, this solution of organizational decentralization didn’t take the 
Central Government, to the situation desired initially. In such a way, urged to 
reorganize the local finances, with a more responsible spirit and the rationality.  
 
LOCAL FINANCES 
 
Only from 1987, with the Law 1/87, of several laws approved from 1979, it’s possible 
to find a real share system of the public resources between the Central Administration 
and the Local Administration. Until then, these systems didn’t follow any rule, leaving 
the local authorities to the free will of the Central Government. With that Law the 
situation was changed, because, the discretionary used by the Central Government in 
the share of the public resources was limited by the introduction of a fixed and 
automatic formula that allows to know, at the beginning, the amount to transfer to the 
local authorities. But, this law has a problem: the calculation of the transfers took as 
support the amount predicted in the State Budget and not the amount effectively 
collected. This situation would become to be resolved with the subsequent law. 
However, in any way, this situation allows to the local authorities a bigger autonomy in 
his management. 
 
Nowadays, the Local Finances have a new legal diploma – Law 2/2007. This new law 
appears in a context of budgetary consolidation in which the objective of the Central 
Government it’s the reduction of the public expenditures. In this way, it seems 
opportune to us fits this new fact in the global process of reform. Will be that constitutes 
a reflex of the administrative reform and has an inclination more decentralized? Or will 
be that, in spite of all the efforts, the sense of this new law is more centralized? 
 
Participation of Local Government in the Taxes of the State 
 
One of the forms where it’s possible to evaluate the existence of a more centralized or 
decentralized system is the existence of Central Administration transfers to Local 
Administration. In Portugal, the share system is result of the several Local Finances 
Laws. This system aims to guarantee the financial the vertical balance (understood like 
an equitable distribution of the taxes collected between all level of administration) and 
the financial horizontal balance (understood like the form of redistributing the resources 
for the most discriminated regions) (Street-vendors, 1998). It’s constitute a fact that a 
significant number of the Portuguese local authorities depend of the amount of the 
transfers of the State to be able to bring his responsibilities into effect. However, there 
are authors, such as Watt (2006), that defend that is preferable a system that allows to 
the Local Governments an appropriate power of local taxation (that does not exist in the 
Portuguese case) than a system where the local authorities depend of the transfers of the 
State. 
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Comparatively with the previous law, the new Local Finances Law introduces several 
modifications, concerning to the share of public resources between the State and the 
Local Governments. This sharing includes three new different forms (figure 4).  
 
Figure 4 – Share of the Public Resources between State and Local Governments 
 
 
Law 42/98 
 
 
Law 2/2007 
 
FBF 
 
33% * 
[(PIT+CIT+VAT) /3] FBF 25,3% * [(PIT+CIT+VAT) /3] 
PIT Variable participation of 5 % in the PIT of the passive subjects with fiscal residence in the local authority. 
 
MSF 
Item to transfer annually by State Budget signed to 
the financing to the social functions of the local 
authorities. 
 
First, the Local Governments maintains the right to a participation in the Financial 
Balance Fund (FBF) (figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 – Share of the Financial Balance Fund 
 
 
Law 42/98 
 
Law  2/2007 
20,5% MGF 50% GMF 
4,5% BMF  30,5%  Municipalities 
5,5% CMF 
25,3%  
Municipalities 
50% CMF 
33% * [(PIT+CIT+VAT) 
/3] 
2,5%  
Parishes  
25,3% * [(PIT+CIT+VAT) 
/3] 
 
 
In a first analysis, it seems that the new law demonstrates a reduction of the transfers in 
the global amount of the municipal revenues. From 30,5 per cent of the average of the 
revenue from the Personal Income Tax (PIT), the Corporate Income Tax (CIT) and the 
Value-Added Tax (VAT), the municipalities passed to have 25,3 per cent of the same 
average. Add to this, the value of the FBF pass to be shared in function of two funds: 
the Municipal General Fund (MGF) and the Municipal Cohesion Fund (MCF). The 
Municipal Base Fund (MBF) created with the purpose to permit the Local Governments 
the minimum conditions to his functioning it was extinguished by the new law. 
 
About the MGF, it was it’s propose to guarantee to tLocal Governments the monetary 
resources appropriated to the fulfillment of the attributions defined by law. With new 
law, the value of this fund increases to 50 %. The share criteria of this fund were 
changed, distinguishing positively the Local Governments which one part of the 
territory it’s affected to Rede Natura 20004 or protected area not joined that Rede Natura 
and the population (figure 6). 
 
 
                                                
4 Project of environmental nature that aims to affect part of the territory to the protection of habitats, 
animal and vegetable sorts. 
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Figure 6 – Share criteria of Municipal General Fund 
 
 
Law 42/98 
 
 
Law 2/2007 
50% Resident Population 
30% Number of 
municipalities  
5% Equally for all 1.ª Phase 
(Three T.U.) 
20% Area. 
40% Resident Population 
65% Population  5%	  Resident Population	  with	  fewer	  15	  years.	  30%	  Area.	   25% Area and 5% area Rede Natura 2000 and protected area   OR 15%	  Number	  of	  Parishes 2.ª Phase (Municipality T.U.) 10%	  PIT	  
Share by 
each 
municipality 
20% Area and 10% area Rede Natura 2000 and protected area 
(municipalities with more than 70% of territory affected to 
Rede Natura 2000and protected area). 
 
The share of the remainder 50 per cent of the FBF is effectuated through the MCF. This 
fund has the objective to correct the asymmetries in benefit of the municipalities less 
developed, being reserved to the Local Governments that have values below the 
national average. It’s calculated on the basis of the Tax Need Index (TNI) and the 
Inequality of Opportunities Index (IOI). This increase (of 5, 5 per cent for 50 per cent) 
aims to promote the territorial cohesion to fill in inequality situations. This mechanism 
is essential to guarantee equity in the share of the resources, that is, it claims more 
justice in the redistribution of the resources. 
 
Secondly, the Local Governments have the right to a variable participation of 5 per cent 
in the PIT of the passive subjects with fiscal residence in the local authority. This  
participation its composed by a fixed part of 2  per cent and for a variable part that can 
reach 3 per cent, being the Local Governments the one to define which the percentage 
of the income of PIT they want to collect (between 0 % and 3 %).  When the local 
authority did not decide to collect the maxim value, the difference will be considered as 
a deduction to the taxpayer. There exist some aspects to take into account with this new 
instrument. First of all, this mechanism will be able to have implications in the fiscal 
load of the individuals that does not agree with the beginning of the contributive 
capacity (two individuals who fulfill similar functions and enjoy of the same profit, they 
will be able to have a fiscal different load). In the second place, this new mechanism 
will be able to be understood like a reinforcement of the tax capacity of the local 
authorities, promoting its autonomy to collect revenues. Add to this, it’s possible to 
discuss the practice or not of different taxes, in other words, if a given local authority 
adopts, for example, the percentage of 5 per cent what will be the justification for 
another local authority adopts the percentage of 2 per cent? The only reservations it’s 
for local authorities more rural, who needs developing mechanisms of fixation of people 
and families. On the other side, for the urban local authorities, the difference isn’t so 
relevant. Even supposing that the local authorities practice different taxes, it was 
necessary that the person’s mobility was a reality and those percentages justifying this 
same mobility. For last, this new aspect can promote the fiscal intermunicipal 
competition, increasing the responsibility of the local elects for his financial decisions 
and where the citizen will be able to have a more active paper. Even so, only with the 
time it will be possible to evaluate the impact of this situation, but having in account the 
necessity of the local authorities to collect revenues and the apparent reduction of the 
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transfers of the State it’s seems consensual the application of the maximum tax, 
excepting the local authorities that consider this mechanism one form of fixation 
persons and families. 
  
Third, the local authorities also have right a so-called Municipal Social Fund (MSF). 
This fund is new and it’s consigned to finance the competences associated to social 
functions (education, health and social action). It seems to represent an instrument of 
decentralization. However, the new law defines a fund to finance expenditures 
associated to social functions, but doesn’t indicate a rule for his application, returning to 
the situation previous to 1987.  The Central Government has total discretionarity to 
decide annually the value to distribute, evidencing the centralized system to get a bigger 
efficiency and control of the expenditures.    
 
In synthesis, and after a more deep analysis, it seems that the reduction of the transfers 
of State is not so significant. The reduction of the FBF, in our opinion, is compensated 
by the participation of 5 per cent in the PIT. In our opinion, the main problem resides in 
MSF. This new mechanism represents a retrocession face to the previous law, due to the 
discricionarity of the central power, evidencing the centrality of the Central Government 
and the limitation of the autonomy of the local authorities in his management. 
 
What concerns to the Parishes, these continues to have a participation in the State taxes 
equivalent a 2,5 per cent of the average of the revenue from the PIT, the CIT and the 
VAT. However, the share criteria had suffered some modifications: half of the Parishes 
Financing Fund (PFF) passes to be distributed consonant the Parishes is integrated in 
predominantly urban areas, medially urban areas or predominantly rural areas (figure 7).  
 
Figure 7 – Share Criterion of Parishes Financing Fund 
  
 
Law 42/98 
 
 
Law 2/2007 
50% Resident Population 14% Predominantly urbane areas 
30% Number of parishes. 11% Medially urbane areas  1.ª Phase (Three U.T.) 
20% Area. 
50% Typologies 
25% Predominantly rural areas 
25% equally by all. 5% Parishes 
50% Number of habitants. 30% Number of habitants 2.ª Phase (Parishes U.T.) 
25% Area. 
Share by each  
Parishes 
15% Area 
 
 
 
The New Indebtedness Limits of the Local Government 
 
Beyond the financial transfers system constitute one of the forms of evaluating the 
existence, or not, of a more centralized system, the credit recourse by local authorities 
also could be understood like that. The fact of the Central Government define rules to 
limit credit recourse represents, by itself, a mechanism of control practiced by that level 
of Government. On the other hand, this mechanism also could be understood as a form 
of the Central Government limited the form as the Local Government manages his 
resources, promoting a more efficient management. Following logic of budgetary 
consolidation, rigour and efficiency, the new Local Finances Law redefines the 
indebtedness limits of the local authorities (figure 8). 
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Figure 8 – Indebtedness Limits of Municipalities 
 
 
Law 42/98 
 
 
Law 2/2007 
 Municipal net indebtedness  
125% Revenues 
 
Municipal Taxes, FBF, PIT, municipal 
surcharge and the results of entities of 
the enterprise sector. 
Short-term Loans  
10% Revenues 
 
MBF, MGF and MCF 
Short-term Loans 
10% Revenues 
 
Municipal Taxes, FBF, PIT, municipal 
surcharge and the results of entities of 
the enterprise sector. 
Medium and long-
term Loans  
Annual charges with 
capital: 
 
- 1/8 MBF, MGF and MCF; 
or 
- 10 per cento of the 
investment expenditures in 
the previous year. 
Medium and long-
term Loans 
100% Revenues 
 
Municipal Taxes, FBF, PIT, municipal 
surcharge and the results of entities of 
the enterprise sector.. 
 
Analyzing the figure, we can conclude that the new Local Finances Law introduces 
some changes. Most significant will be, perhaps, the substitution of the form as the 
indebtedness limits is calculated, having a global option for municipalities revenues. 
The indebtedness limits passed, thus, to be calculated in function of municipalities 
revenues. 
 
Another changing is the inclusion of an indebtedness global limit, so-called municipal 
net indebtedness. It’s defined by law that the total amount of debt of each municipality 
cannot exceed 125 per cent of the amount of the revenues from the municipal taxes, 
FBF participations, PIT participations, municipal surcharge and from the results of the 
entities of the enterprise local sector, relative to the previous year. 
 
In parallel with this limit, the new law defines new indebtedness limits for the short- 
term loans and medium and long-term loans. In case of the short-term loans (as it’s 
showed the figure 8), it’s seem that the indebtedness limit was enlarged. Previously, the 
annual average amount of this type of loans could not exceed 10 per cent of the MBF, 
MGF and MCF participations. Now, the municipalities can use short-term loans until 
his amount does not exceed 10 of the amount of the revenues from the municipal taxes, 
FBF participations, PIT participations, municipal surcharge and from the results of the 
entities of the enterprise local sector, relative to the previous year. However, we must 
have in attention that the short-term loans are assumed only to resolve cash constraints 
and must be amortized in one year. This situation seems to bring some flexibility to the 
municipalities, but it doesn’t have implications in the investments that are financed by 
medium and long-term loans.   
 
About medium and long-term loans, the new law seems to be more restrictive. The 
previous law defined that the annual charge with capital (interest plus amortizations) 
could not exceed the biggest of the limits (um oitavo of MBF, MGF and MCF 
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participations or 10 per cent of the investment expenditures in the previous year). With 
the new law the total amount of the medium and long-term loans cannot exceed the 
value of the most important revenues: municipal taxes, FBF participations, PIT 
participations, municipal surcharge and results of the entities of the enterprise local 
sector, relative to the previous year. Thus, the limit of the debt is now calculated on base 
of the most important municipalities revenues.  
 
In what concerns to the Parishes, these only can use the short-term loans. The new 
Local Finances Law maintains the same indebtedness limit, that is, 10 per cent of the 
PFF participations and included a new limit for the supplier’s debt. These debts can not 
exceed 50 per cent of the total revenues collected in the previous year (figure 9). In our 
opinion this limitation indicating one more restriction imposed by the central power, 
evidencing the existence of centralized system.    
 
Figure 9 – Indebtedness Limits of Parishes 
 
 
Law 42/98 
 
 
Law 2/2007 
Short-term Loans  10% PFF Short-term Loans 10% FFF 
  Suppliers debt 50% Total revenues in the previous year.  
 
 
In our opinion the indebtedness limits in the new Local Finances Laws are more 
restrictive. In spite of a greater flexibility in the short-terms loans, the existence of 
global indebtedness limit, the change in the form of how the indebtedness limits of 
medium and long-term loans is calculated and the restrictions in Parishes borrowing, 
showing the control used by Central Government and, consequently, a more centralized 
system.     
 
The new Law of Municipal Enterprises and its impact on Local Finances  
 
It was already possible to see that the Municipal Enterprises solution has a perspective 
to promote the decentralization and the fragmentation of public unities, allowing 
individualize responsibilities and potentiating a more flexible management. Has we 
said, from the implementation of this mechanism there resulted financial imbalance 
situations of the Municipal Enterprises. So, to stimulate an efficient management of the 
resources of Local Government, the present law that regulates the enterprise local sector 
– Law 53-F/2006, changing the responsibility type of Local Governments regarding his 
enterprise sector. Thus, in the case of the Municipal Enterprise presents negative results 
(adding operational results and financial charges), the municipalities are obliged to 
transfer the necessary financial amount to balance the accounts.      
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Como pudemos verificar, os Governos Locais em Portugal atravessam uma fase de 
desafios importantes, no âmbito de um processo generalizado de reforma 
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administrativa. Existe um esforço, por parte de todos os agentes envolvidos, para 
melhorar o nível do serviço público. Desta forma, foram adoptadas práticas e 
experiências identificadas com o movimento conhecido por Nova Gestão Pública. 
Assim, segundo este modelo de gestão, a tradicional Administração Pública, deve 
evoluir para uma estratégia onde cria pontes e estabelece parcerias com os demais 
agentes do mercado. Com isto promove a especialização e ganha em termo de 
eficiência, permitindo ainda que o poder público se concentre na definição de opções 
para as políticas públicas e de regulação do mercado, onde as tarefas operacionais da 
Administração Pública estão a cargo de outros agentes (públicos, privados e do 3º 
sector). Pretende-se também flexibilizar e adaptar instrumentos de gestão disponíveis, à 
nova realidade da globalização, dos constrangimentos financeiros e da maior exigência 
por parte dos cidadãos. Advoga-se também, a necessidade de implementar práticas de 
responsabilização e avaliação dos resultados obtidos pela gestão pública, baseando-se 
sobretudo em critérios de gestão em vez dos de confiança política. 
 
Desta forma, os Governos Locais promoveram a criação de Empresas Municipais, 
transferindo a responsabilidade operacional, de alguma das suas competências, para 
uma estrutura criada formalmente para agir à luz dos princípios de eficiência e eficácia, 
sujeita as forças de mercado. Apesar de ser obrigada a respeitar alguns princípios 
básicos da Administração Pública, às Empresas Municipais são permitidas práticas de 
gestão semelhantes as usadas pelos privados. Como verificamos, apesar de se traduzir 
numa evolução de configuração organizacional, outros instrumentos careciam de ser 
aplicados de maneira a permitir que a gestão pública atinja os objectivos da reforma. 
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